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 Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a model of efficiency wage with endogenous workers flows 
in interaction with imperfect competition on the product markets. Subject to 
economy-wide shocks, firms hire and fire workers thus generating a certain 
turnover. We show that the intensity of this turnover negatively affects workers’ 
incentives and induces higher efficiency wage premia. Increased competition 
pushes real wages up but effort incentive requirements prevent large wage 
adjustments. Hence, adjustments are made with quantities: both the separation 
and hiring rates increase with competition, increasing the wage premium and 
contributing to lower employment. As a consequence, an employment-
maximising level of competition may exist. 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
In der Analyse wird ein Effizienzlohn-Modell vorgeschlagen, das endogene 
Beschäftigten-Ströme mit unvollständigem Wettbewerb auf den Gütermärkten 
verbindet. Unternehmen reagieren auf volkswirtschaftliche Schocks mit „Heuern 
und Feuern“ und verstärken so den Umschlag an Beschäftigten. Es wird 
gezeigt, dass sich das Ausmaß dieses Beschäftigten-Umschlags negativ auf die 
Anreize für die Arbeitnehmer auswirkt und zu höheren Effizienzlohn-Prämien 
führt. Ein intensivierter Wettbewerb lässt Reallöhne steigen, aber Anreize zur 
Steigerung der Arbeitsintensität verhindern Lohnanpassungen im großen Stil. 
Demzufolge kommt es zu Mengenanpassungen:  sowohl Entlassungs- wie 
Einstellungszahlen wachsen mit zunehmendem Wettbewerb, wodurch die 
Lohnprämie steigt und die Beschäftigung sinkt. Daraus ist zu folgern, dass es 
einen beschäftigungsmaximalen Grad des Wettbewerbs geben könnte. 
 
 
JEL: E24, J41, J63, L13 
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1 Introduction
The detrimental inßuence of labor market imperfections on employment perfor-
mance has long been emphasized in the literature1 and it has led to a large set of
policy recommendations in favor of labor market reforms. A recent literature has
more speciÞcally focused on the interactions between imperfections in the labor
and the product markets.2 The basic idea is that imperfections in one market
combine with those of the other markets to make matters worse in each of them.
As a consequence for economic policy, labor market reforms should be accompa-
nied by reforms on the product markets, the latter being expected to alleviate
the burden of adjustments on the labor market. International organizations such
as the OECD have advocated the implementation of structural reforms both in
the labor and the product markets, towards more ßexibility regarding wages and
employment protection on the one hand, and the promotion of competition on
the product markets by regulatory reform on the other side.3 The elimination
of imperfections in one market will facilitate the necessary adjustments in other
markets.
This argument can also be stated in terms of employment ßuctuations and
unemployment persistence. Less imperfect competition would increase price and
wage elasticities and would reduce the impact of shocks on (un)employment.
This argument is also found in the so-called administered pricing thesis4 for
which concentrated industries should be characterized by more rigid prices than
competitive ones. Exogenous demand or cost shocks would therefore lead to
wider quantity adjustments; thus for a given adverse shock, employment should
decrease more in more concentrated industries.
This assertion is indeed in contrast with recent empirical Þndings as docu-
mented in particular by Weiss [1998] where it is shown that both the long-run
level and the rate of adjustment of industry employment decrease with concen-
tration. The latter result, in particular, shows that more competitive industries
are characterized by a faster adjustment of employment to shocks, and display
stronger ßuctuations in employment compared to imperfectly competitive in-
dustries. In other words, imperfectly competitive industries are shown to use
their market power in such a way as to smooth employment ßuctuations. Al-
though Weiss does not provide a clear theoretical explanation to his Þndings,5
the empirical result has straightforward implications. This states that it is indeed
1See for instance Layard et al. [1991], Nickell [1997], Siebert [1997].
2Boeri et al. [2000], Nickell [1999], Nicolletti et al. [2000], Gersbach [1999] and [2000].
3OECD [1994], Nicoletti et al. [2000], OECD [2000].
4See Lebow [1992] and references in Weiss [1998] for instance.
5Weiss [1998] proposes a theoretical model of employment and adjustment costs. Additional
justiÞcations for a negative relationship between unemployment and concentration are also
given. A conjecture found in Scherer [1980] is mentioned according to which concentrated
industries making extra-proÞts could accept disguised unemployment when demand is low,
thus avoiding the costs of rehiring when the demand level increases again.
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problematic to assume that increased competition would unambiguously reduce
employment adjustments in response to shocks.
Hence, the real nature of the interplay between product market and labor
market imperfections is still unclear.6 One general idea is that market power on
the product market generate rents that may be captured by employees through
higher wages. The impact of product markets competition on the operation of
the labor market depends on the wage setting mechanism which complements the
model. Nicoletti et al. [2000] and Nickell [1999] consider mainly that wages are
Þxed according to a wage bargaining model. One can show that the bargained
wage is generally decreasing in the elasticity of labor demand;7 then, increased
competition leads to a lower bargained real wage. Hence, the authors conclude
that single unionized Þrms which face increased competition will beneÞt from a
higher labor demand elasticity and a lower bargained real wage.
This conclusion that increased product markets competition will improve la-
bor markets eﬃciency needs not hold under diﬀerent assumptions concerning
the wage setting mechanism, particularly if one considers a model of eﬃciency
wages. The link between eﬃciency wage and market power is not well explored
in the literature. As Nicoletti et al. mention it, the determinants of the eﬃciency
wage level are in general exogenous elements: in none of these cases does there
appear to be any obvious mechanism by which the market power of the Þrm can
enter the story (p. 28). This paper will show that a mechanism indeed exists
which links up the market power of Þrms to the determination of the eﬃciency
wage by endogenizing labor market separation following demand or productivity
shocks. In fact, one of the exogenous determinants of the eﬃciency wage level
is the separation rate, which is understood at the individual worker level as the
probability of losing ones job even when one provides the correct level of eﬀort.
Ceteris paribus this exogenous element contributes to increasing the level of the
eﬃciency wage. This usually exogenous important determinant of the eﬃciency
wage is made endogenous in this paper.
This paper proposes a model of imperfect competition à la Cournot with an
endogenous determination of workers ßows in and out of unemployment, where
wages are determined according to an eﬃciency wage mechanism. More precisely,
we assume that the economy moves across two diﬀerent states of technology:
Good and Bad. When moving, Þrms respectively hire or Þre workers thus gen-
erating a certain turnover over time on the labor market. Under the assumption
of imperfect monitoring within companies, labor force turnover negatively aﬀects
workers incentives. We show that increased competition on the product market
increases workers separation rate and translates into a higher eﬃciency wage
premium. Hence, our model clearly shows how wage formation can be negatively
6The Þrst attempt to systematically evaluate the impact of product market competition on
employment at the aggregate level is done by Boeri et al. [2000] and Nicoletti at al. [2000].
7See Layard, Nickell and Jackman [1991].
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aﬀected by the (endogenous) change in the size of the separation rate which is
generated by increased product markets competition. The basic intuition behind
the working of the model is the following. The combination of imperfect com-
petition and eﬃciency wage contributes to smoothing employment diﬀerentials
across the two states of the economy; this reduces the separation of workers as
a response to demand and/or productivity shocks and contains wage pressure.
However, because of relative real wage rigidities determined by the wage setting
mechanism, an increase in competition leads to larger employment diﬀerentials
across states, that is to a stronger turnover on the labor market. As a con-
sequence, an adverse eﬀect on workers incentives is in place which ultimately
generates -at the equilibrium- wage pressure, larger separations, and may under
certain conditions lead to a higher level of unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below presents the basic model
of eﬃciency wage and imperfect competition on the product markets. Section 3
presents the macroeconomic equilibrium, which is shown to be unique in certain
conditions. section 4 establishes the result that an increase in product market
competition may lead to a lower performance in terms of employment. A brief
conclusion is proposed in the Þnal section.
2 The Model
This section sets out the model of imperfect competition on the product market
and eﬃciency wage on the labor market. We Þrst derive the labor demand curve
and the price setting real wage resulting from the decisions taken by imperfectly
competitive Þrms subject to aggregate shocks.
2.1 Labor demand
We assume the existence of a multi-sector economy with a single Þnal good used
for consumption and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed over [0, 1]. The
Þnal good is produced according to a constant returns to scale technology using
all the intermediate goods:
eYt = µZ 1
0
Yt (s)
η−1
η ds
¶ η
η−1
(1)
η > 1 is the absolute value of the elasticity of substitution between intermediates.
The Þnal good is produced competitively, but there is imperfect competition in
each of the intermediate sectors. More speciÞcally, it is assumed that there are
n Þrms in each intermediate sector engaged in Cournot-type competition. Each
Þrm is small compared to the economy but has a certain market power within
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its sector. Such a speciÞcation leads to a derived demand addressed to sector s
equal to:
Ys =
µ
Ps
P
¶−η
· eY (2)
where Ps is the price of intermediate s and P is the Þnal goods price. One further
has:
P =
µZ 1
0
P 1−ηs ds
¶ 1
1−η
(3)
Each Þrm j in every sector s has an identical production function which uses
labor as its sole input :
yjt = αjt · lγjt (4)
0 < γ 5 1, lj is the input of eﬀective labor, i.e. lj workers providing the expected
eﬀort level. We will later pay special attention to the case where γ = 1, i.e. the
case of constant returns to scale in the intermediate goods production.
Intermediate Þrms are subject to common aggregate shocks which aﬀect their
productivity. One may think of these shocks as either demand shocks resulting
from changes in demand or alternatively as supply shocks stemming from ßuc-
tuations in factors other than labor or from a varying technological eﬃciency. We
adopt the same shock speciÞcation as Bertola [1990], Bertola and Ichino [1995]
or Bertola and Rogerson [1997]. The shocks realizations are denoted αt at time
t. More speciÞcally, the αs follow a two-state Markov chain with symmetric
transition probability p:
αt+1 =
½
αG with probability p if αt = αB and with probability 1− p if αt = αG
αB with probability 1− p if αt = αB and with probability p if αt = αG
(5)
and αG > αB > 0. We further assume some degree of persistence in the shocks
realization: p < 1/2.
There are thus two states for the technology and the economy, a good state
denoted G with a high labor productivity, and a bad state denoted B charac-
terized by a low value for labor productivity. The long-run probability for the
economy to be in either a good or a bad state is 0.5. This speciÞcation generates
aggregate ßuctuations in output and employment.
Firms hiring decisions are identical across sectors. Only spot markets for
labor are open and all intermediate Þrms know the realization of the shock be-
fore taking their employment decisions. ProÞt maximization for Þrm j in any
intermediate sector gives:
Ps ·
µ
1 +
∂Ps
∂yj
· yj
Ps
¶
= W j · ∂lj
∂yj
=
1
γ
·W j · α−
1
γ
j · y
1
γ
−1
j (6)
Wj is the nominal wage paid by Þrm j
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Each sector has the same structure, therefore the price of each intermediate is
the same, which implies because of (3) that Ps = P for all s. Therefore, the real
wage for the Þrm (Wj/Ps) will be identical to the real wage for the worker (Wj/P ).
In what follows, we can drop the subscript s without risk of confusion. We denote:
YB = n·yB as the total output of intermediate Þrms when the economy is in a bad
state and YG = n · yG the total output of intermediate Þrms when the economy
is in a good state. Likewise, lG (lB) is employment of a representative Þrm in a
good (bad) state. WG and WB are nominal wages for a worker employed when
the economy is in a good state and a bad state respectively. Following this, (6)
can be expressed as:
P =
1£
1− ε
n
¤ · W jαj
γ
· lγ−1j
(7)
j = G,B. ε ≡ 1
η
is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between interme-
diates,
¡
1− ε
n
¢
is the inverse of the mark-up applied to marginal costs by imper-
fectly competitive Þrms. As is standard in Cournot competition, the mark-up
decreases when the number of competing Þrms n increases. Besides, the mark-up
is small when ε is small i.e. when there is a high degree of substitutability among
the intermediate goods. ε (η) and n are indicators of the degree of imperfection
in competition. Since ε (η) comes from the production function for the Þnal
good, we can suppose that it is largely invariant to policy changes designed to
promote a more intense competition in the product market. It is essentially a
technological parameter in our setting. n on the other hand may be thought of
as potentially subject to the inßuence of competition policy such as the removal
of administrative barriers to entry, the opening the economy akin to the comple-
tion of the Single European Market or other measures that make entry into an
industry easier. This is why we will concentrate in what follows on the eﬀects of
a change in the number of competitors n.
(7) gives an expression for the price setting real wages for Þrms in either
states:
αj
γ
· lγ−1j ·
³
1− ε
n
´
= wj (8)
with wj ≡ WjP . Price setting real wages are inßuenced by the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor (the αj
γ
· lγ−1j term) and by Þrms mark-up behavior (the term
between squared brackets). This is standard in the presence of imperfect compe-
tition, real wages are lower than the marginal productivity of labor because of the
mark-up. This distortion increases with the degree of imperfection of competition
(a high ε and a low n).
Having determined the price-setting relative real wage, we can now turn to
the wage-setting side of the economy where the levels for the real wages in both
a good or a bad state will be determined.
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2.2 Wage setting
The economy is populated with a Þxed number N of agents who supply labor
inelastically within each intermediate sector. Each sector has thus an immobile
labor force equal to N . Following the symmetry assumptions used throughout,
the sectorial employment rate L/N is equal to the aggregate rate. Each individ-
ual worker is characterized by an identical utility function, where instantaneous
utility depends on the real wage8 and on the eﬀort provided on the job:
ut = w
j
t − et (9)
j = G,B; et, the eﬀort level, can take two values, 0, which means that the worker
is shirking and e, which means that the worker provides the expected work
eﬀort. The contribution of a shirker to eﬀective labor is nil, whereas an individual
working with the expected eﬀort level e contributes for one unit to eﬀective labor.
wjt is the real wage. This simple speciÞcation will allow us to consider an eﬃciency
wage model in the spirit of Solow [1979], Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], Akerlof and
Yellen [1990] or Saint-Paul [1996]. The basic principle of these models is that a
Þrm may not wish to lower wages even in the presence of unemployment for fear
of reducing the incentives to provide the correct level of eﬀort on the job. Each
Þrm has a monitoring device whose ineﬃciency is measured by the parameter xt:
A worker is caught shirking with probability 1 − xt and, when caught, loses his
job at the end of period t.
But, as is common in eﬃciency wage models, shirking is not the only way to
lose ones job. Every model of eﬃciency wage takes into account an independent
and exogenous probability of job loss. In our setting, this probability is made
endogenous: Þrms shed labor when they are hit by an adverse shock which forces
them to downward adjust their labor force. We denote qt the probability of losing
ones job following an adverse shock, then:
qt =
lGt − lBt
lGt
=
µ
1− 1
lt
¶
(10)
Workers are concerned by this type of job loss only when the economy is in a
good state, since in that case Þrms are likely to be hit by an adverse shock. The
situation in a bad state can only improve or at worst stay the same. Assume that
the economy is in a good state. Then at each subsequent period, with a given
probability the economy is hit by an adverse shock and Þrms have to shed labor.
Workers having lost their job become unemployed for at least one period and get
the (real) unemployment allowance wt,9 they may Þnd another job when Þrms
8i.e. the consumption level of the Þnal good.
9The Þnancing of this unemployment allowance is not explicitely taken into account. One
may think of it as Þnanced by a non distortionary lump-sum tax or alternatively as coming
from a subsistence activity nundertaken by individuals.
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hire again. The reverse occurs when the economy is in a bad state. The ßow
probability out of unemployment is at, which is the probability for an unemployed
of Þnding a job.
Workers have an inÞnite horizon and discount future at the rate β ≤ 1.
We can now compute the discounted utilities associated with the various possible
positions for an individual: being employed when the economy is in a good state or
in a bad state, and shirking or not shirking, or being unemployed. The discounted
utility of a worker who shirks at time t when the economy is in a good state is
V GSt , and V
G
NSt when he does not shirk. The utilities associated to working when
the economy is in a bad state are likewise V BSt (shirking) and V
B
NSt (not shirking).
The utility of being unemployed in either state is UBt and U
G
t . We then have:
V GSt = w
G
t +β ·
½
xt · (1− p)V Gt+1 + (1− xt) ·
£
(1− p) · UGt+1 + p · UBt+1
¤
+
xt · p ·
£
(1− qt) · V Bt+1 + qt · UBt+1
¤ ¾ (11)
V GNSt = w
G
t − et + β ·
©
(1− p)V Gt+1 + p ·
£
(1− qt) · V Bt+1 + qt · UBt+1
¤ª
(12)
V BSt = w
B
t + β ·
½
xt · (1− p) · V Bt+1+
xt · p · V Gt+1 + (1− xt) ·
£
(1− p) · UBt+1 + p · UGt+1
¤ ¾ (13)
V BNSt = w
B
t − et + β ·
£
(1− p) · V Bt+1 + p · V Gt+1
¤
(14)
UBt = wt + β ·
©
(1− p) · UBt+1 + p ·
£
(1− at) · UGt+1 + at · V Et+1
¤ª
(15)
UGt = wt + β ·
£
(1− p) · UGt+1 + p · UBt+1
¤
(16)
V Et+1 is the utility of being employed in a Þrm hiring at time t+1. In equilibrium,
only Þrms hit by a positive shock will hire so that V Et+1 will be the utility associated
with working in a good state.
The level of real wage in each Þrm must be set at a level such that workers
have an incentive not to shirk. These no-shirking conditions are:
V jNSt ≥ V jSt (17)
The conditions V jNSt = V
j
St = V
j
t , j = G,B give the two limit wage levels
wGit
¡
wBit
¢
, wBit
¡
wGit
¢
under which the optimal behavior for the worker is to shirk.
Since we are dealing with constant values for all variables at the steady-state equi-
librium, we may dispense with the time subscripts from now on. Both wGi
¡
wBi
¢
and wBt
¡
wGi
¢
are aﬃne functions.
From these conditions, one may deduce the levels of the real wages paid in
either state of the economy. This is shown in the proposition below.
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Proposition 1 The incentive-compatible equilibrium wages levels for both type
Þrms are such that:
w∗B = w + e ·
³
1−β−p·[2·(1−β)−β·(a·(1−2·p)−(1−a)·p·q)]
β·(1−x)·[1−p·(2−p·q)] + 1
´
w∗G = w + e ·
³
1−β−p·[2·(1−β)−(1−β·p)·q]
β·(1−x)·[1−p·(2−p·q)] + 1
´
Proof. The no-shirking conditions (17) can be expressed as:
wG ≥ wGi (wB) (18)
wB ≥ wBi (wG)
Both wGi (wB) and w
B
i (wG) are aﬃne functions. In the general case, they deÞne
an area in the (wB, wG) plane where both incentive constraints are fulÞlled. The
equilibrium real wage rates must be such that both constraints are simultaneously
satisÞed since wages in either state depend on the wages paid in the other state.
Firms pay the lowest wages compatible with both constraints. The intersection
of the two schedules wGi (wB) and w
B−1
i (wG) deÞnes the equilibrium levels of real
wages rates for good and bad states: wGi (w
∗
B) = w
B−1
i (w
∗
G)
The eﬃciency wage paid by Þrms in a bad state is higher the higher the hiring
rate and the lower the separation rate, while in a good state the eﬃciency wage is
higher the higher the separation rate. The justiÞcation for these results is simple.
When the hiring rate increases, shirkers caught (and Þred) while the economy
is in a bad state will have a higher probability of Þnding new employment if the
economy shifts back to a good state. Therefore, a shirkers utility increases and
a compensation in the form of a higher wage in a bad state is required in order
to enforce the no-shirking condition.
Firms in a good state can be hit by a bad shock and have to shed labor.
Workers can then be Þred regardless of their eﬀort. This possibility is all the
more plausible that the separation rate is high; thus a higher separation rate
reduces the discounted utility associated to a no-shirking strategy, which calls for
a higher eﬃciency wage in a good state.
The separation rate aﬀects also workers in a bad state. In fact, there is always
a possibility for Þrms to be hit by a good shock and shift back to a good state.
A higher separation rate, because it pushes real wage up in a good state, also
increases the wage prospect for workers who are currently employed (in a bad
state) and allows for a decrease of the eﬃciency wage paid by Þrms in a bad
state.
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3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
This section endogenizes the separation and hiring rates, which have been shown
to play an important role in the deÞnition of the wages rates. Wages are set
by Þrms in either state of the economy at the minimum level which respects
the eﬀort-incentive constraint and the no-arbitrage condition for workers. Every
worker provides the necessary eﬀort so that eﬀective and employed labor are
equal. At the beginning of each period, with a probability p, the state of the
economy changes. If the economy goes from a good state to a bad state, Þrms
have to shed labor in order to adjust their labor force to its optimal value, while
if the economy goes from a bad state to a good state, Þrms need to make the
opposite adjustment. In the former case, laid-oﬀ workers join the ranks of the
unemployed while, in the latter situation, some unemployed workers Þnd new
employment. Recalling that a is the ßow probability out of unemployment, and
deÞning: eN = N/n, one has:
a ·
h eN − lBi = q · lG (19)
Equation (8) deÞnes the price setting real wage for Þrms in either states:
wjps =
αj
γ
· lγ−1j ·
³
1− ε
n
´
(20)
and the eﬃciency wages are:
wBws = w + e ·
µ
1 +
1− β − p · [2 · (1− β)− β · (a · (1− 2 · p)− (1− a) · p · q)]
β · (1− x) · [1− p · (2− p · q)]
¶
(21)
wGws = w + e ·
µ
1 +
1− β − p · [2 · (1− β)− (1− β · p) · q]
β · (1− x) · [1− p · (2− p · q)]
¶
(22)
Production can be expressed as the output of Þrms in either states:
Yj = n · αj · lγj (23)
Equation (10) for the steady-state is:
q =
lG − lB
lG
=
µ
1− 1
l
¶
(24)
with l ≡ lB
lG
.
Equations (19), (20), (23), (24), (21), and (22) constitute the reduced form of
the model, with wB, wG, lB, lG, a and q as the endogenous variables. No loss of
generality is incurred if we state e = 1.
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We will simplify matters regarding solving the full model by considering the
constant returns to scale case: γ = 1. Call eα = (1− p) · αB + p · αG.We can then
establish the following result.
Proposition 2 If 1−(1−p)·x·β
(1−p)·(1−x)·β + w > αG, eα > 2 · (1−x·β)+(1−x)·β·w(1−x)·(2−ε)·β , w < x1−x −
2−p·(4−ε)
(1−p)·(1−x)·β·(2−p·(2−ε)) and β >
2−p·(4−ε)
(1−p)·x·(2−p·(2−ε)) , then a unique equilibrium exists
characterized by a probability of losing ones job when being employed in a good
state given by:
q∗ = (1−2·p)·[n·(x·β+β·(1−x)·(αG−w)−1)−β·(1−x)·αG·ε]
p·[n·(1−x·β·p−β·p·(1−x)·(αG−w))+p·β·(1−x)·αG·ε] ,
The corresponding value of the hiring rate applying the bad state is given by:
a∗ = n[β·(x+(1−x)·(eα−w))−1]−β·(1−x)·eα·ε
(1−p)·p·β2·[n·(x+(1−x)·(αG−w))−(1−x)·αG·ε] .
Proof. Consider wage determination in a good state. Equation (22) and (20)
must be equalized ex post which reads: αG·
£
1− ε
n
¤
= w+1+1−β·−p·[2·(1−β)−(1−β·p)·q]
β·(1−x)·[1−p·(2−p·q)] .
Since wGws is uniformly increasing in q, the equality allows the derivation of
the equilibrium value of the separation rate q∗(n). To ensure that a positive
equilibrium always exists, we impose restrictions on parameters such as to en-
force wGws < w
G
ps when q = 0 and n = 2, and w
G
ws > w
G
ps when q = 1 and
n → ∞. This corresponds to αG ·
£
1− ε
2
¤
> w + 1 + 1−β·−p·2·(1−β)
β·(1−x)·[1−p·2] and αG <
w + 1 + 1−β·−p·[2·(1−β)−(1−β·p)]
β·(1−x)·[1−p·(2−p)] . We retain the former condition here which Þxes a
minimum value for αG. As for the latter condition, we apply the same kind of
reasoning to a∗ which leads us to deÞne a condition on eα which is similar but more
restrictive than the corresponding condition on αG. Hence, we select to retain
the condition on eα. To ensure the compatibility of the two conditions on eα and
αG, we need to impose the restriction on w reported in the text of proposition 2;
this only makes sense under the condition on β stated in the proposition.
As for the bad state, since wBws is decreasing in q and increasing in a, wage
determination in a bad state deÞnes a hiring schedule a (q;n) with a positive
slope. If we now substitute q∗(n) into equation (21) and hold wBws = w
B
ps we
Þnally obtain the equilibrium value of the hiring rate a∗(n). One can check the
equilibrium value of a is always positive under the conditions given above
Hence, we have by now established suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
a unique equilibrium to which is associated a certain level for real wage rates
and the rate of unemployment. This result has been derived given a certain
degree of imperfection in product market competition, i.e. a certain degree of
concentration or more precisely a certain number of competing Þrms n. Building
on this, we can now move on to the analysis of the macroeconomic consequences
of an increase in competition on the product market.
11
4 Labor market performance with less imper-
fect product markets
This section investigates the consequences of an increase in the number of com-
peting Þrms within each industry. The number of competitors in a given industry
is a straightforward measure of imperfection in Cournot-type models of imperfect
competition. In such models the mark-up on marginal costs decreases when the
number of Þrms increases, and imperfections in competition vanish when this
number goes to inÞnity. More than the price elasticity of demand, which is tech-
nologically derived in our model, the number of competitors in an industry may
be considered, if not as a policy variable, at least as inßuenced by competition
policy measures. In most countries, entry in some industries is de facto if not
de jure restricted, making market structures oligopolistic. Some of these restric-
tions are the consequences of international diﬀerences in regulations, norms or
other administrative matters that make cross-border competition more diﬃcult
that competition between domestic Þrms. The elimination of such barriers to
competition was the aim of the Single European Market completion for instance.
As mentioned before, one expects an improved economic performance from the
implementation of competition policies.
In this model, the eﬀects of an increase in product market competition cannot
just be read oﬀ the shift in the labor demand curve. The consequences in terms
of wage-setting behavior have to be taken into account too. When the number n
of Þrms increases, the price setting wage in either states of the economy increases,
which calls for an adjustment on the labor market to re-equilibrate the levels of
the eﬃciency and price setting wages. Due to real wage rigidities, this adjustment
is mainly done through a modiÞcation of the separation and hiring rates. The
subsequent result in terms of job turnover on the labor market is established in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in product market competition characterized by a
higher number of competing Þrms (a higher n) brings about an increase in the
separation rate q and the hiring rate a.
Proof. One simply needs to calculate the total derivatives of q∗ and a∗ given in
the preceding proposition with respect to n. This gives the following results:
∂q
∂n
= (1−p)·(1−2·p)·(1−x)·αG·β·ε
p·{n·[1−p·β·(x+(1−x)·(αG−w))]+p·β·(1−x)·ε·αG}2 > 0,
∂a
∂n
= (1−x)·ε·[αG·(1−x·β)+eα·x·β+(1−x)·β·w·(αG−eα)]
(1−p)·p·β2·{n·[x+(1−x)·(αG−w)]−(1−x)·ε·αG}2 > 0
Therefore, proposition 3 establishes that an increase in product market com-
petition leads to an increase in job turnover. The rationale of this results is
straightforward. When the number n of Þrms increases, the price setting wage
in a good state increases, which calls for an increase in the separation rate to re-
equilibrate price setting and eﬃciency wage rates. The same mechanism applies
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to wage determination in a bad state and explains why the hiring schedule a (q)
shifts upward when n increases. The consequences of this conclusion, as far as
employment variation across the two states is concerned, are spelled out in the
following corollary.
Corollary 4 Less imperfect product markets lead to larger adjustments of em-
ployment on the labor market for any given size of shocks.
Proof. One can easily derive the expression for employments diﬀerentials across
the two states of the economy. This is given by : ∆L = LG − LB = a·q·Na+q·(1−a) .
One can further show that ∂(∆L)
∂a
= q
2·N
[a+q·(1−a)]2 > 0,
∂(∆L)
∂q
= a
2·N
[a+q·(1−a)]2 > 0
Hence, more competitive product markets are associated with more de facto
ßexible labor markets; for a given size of shocks, the adjustments in the level
of employment are larger when product markets competition is stronger. This
runs contrary to the administered prices theory referred to in the introduction.
What distinguishes our result from the more standard view that associates a
higher degree of product market competition to smaller quantity adjustments is
the wage-setting process. Eﬃciency wage requirements prevent large real wages
adjustments, which would not respect the incentive compatibility constraint for
workers. As a result, the adjustment is made with quantities. On the basis of
these mechanisms, one should therefore expect larger ßuctuations in employment
to be associated with stronger product markets competition.
The consequence of the above results in terms of the average level of the
unemployment rate is not unambiguous. One may take as a measure of average
employment L = LG+LB
2
, where LG and LB are employment when the economy
is in a good state and a bad state respectively. This makes sense because over a
long period, the economy is likely to be in a good state (bad state) half of the
time. Increased competition will aﬀect diﬀerently employment in either state of
the economy. The Þnal impact of increased competition on unemployment clearly
depends on the overall combination of the eﬀects on the hiring and separation
rates. This can be more formally stated as in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Average employment always increases with n for small values
of n. Further increases in the number of Þrms may either increase or decrease
employment depending on the parameter values.
Proof.
Average employment is equal to:
L = (2−q)·a·N
2·(a+q−a·q)
and we deÞne α = αG
αB
. Solving for equilibrium values for q and a gives:
L (n) =
a1 · n2 + b1 · n+ c1
a2 · n2 + b2 · n+ c2 ·
N
2 · (1− p)
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with:
a1 =
½ {β · [x+ (1− x) · (α− w)]− 1} ·
{1− [1− 2 · (1− p) · p] · β · [x+ (1− x) · (αG − w)]}
¾
b1 =
(x− 1) · β · ² ·
 α+ [1− 2 · (1− p) · p] ·· αG − x · α · β − (x+ 2 · (1− x) · α) ·
αG · β + (1− x) · (α+ αG) · β · w
¸ 

c1 = −
©
[1− 2 · (1− p) · p] · (1− x)2 · α · αG · β2 · ²2
ª
a2 = −

1− α · β + x · (−2 + p+ α) · β − (1− 2 p) · p ·
[x+ (1− x) αG]2 · β3 + [x+ (1− x) · αG] ·½ {−2 · p2 + x+ (1− x) · [p · (1− α) + α]} · β2
+2 · (1− 2 p) · p · (1− x) · β3 · w
¾
− (1− x) · β ·
(1− p) · (αG − w)− w
+
½
(1− 2 p) · p
+(1− p) · [2 · x+ (1− x) · (α+ αG)]
¾
· β · w
− (1− x) · β · {1− p · [1 + (1− 2 p) · β]} · w2


b2 =

(1− x) · β · ²·
(p− 1) · αG + α ·
½ −1 + (1− p)
· [x+ 2 · (1− x) · αG] · β
¾
+αG · β ·
½
x+ p ·
½
1− 2 · p− x
+2 · (1− 2 p) · [x · (αG − 1)− αG] β
¾¾
− (1− x) · β ·
·
(1− p) · (α+ αG)
−2 · p · (1− 2 · p) · αG · β
¸
· w


c2 = (1− x )2 · αG · β2 · [(1− 2 p) · p · αG · β − (1− p) · α] · ²2
Total employment is ultimately (i.e. when n→∞) decreasing (increasing) in
n when a1 ·b2−a2 ·b1 < (>) 0 since ∂L∂n ∝ (a1 · b2 − a2 · b1)·n2+2·(a1 · c2 − a2 · c1)·
n+ (b1 · c2 − b2 · c1)
L (n) is discontinuous for two values of n, the roots of a2 · n2 + b2 · n + c2.
These roots correspond to (a+ q − a · q) = 0. Both a and q are increasing with
n. Let n1 be the value of n where a (n) is not deÞned, n2 be such that q (n2) = 0
and n3 such that a (n3) = 0. One has n1 < n2 < n310(Figure 1). We deÞne en
such that a(en) = −q(en)
1−q(en) . en is the largest n for which L (n) is not deÞned, and
limn→enL (n) = −∞.
Only values of n strictly above en make economic sense, and L (n) is always
deÞned for n > en.
10It is straightforward to show that a (n2) < 0.
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We can conclude that for very small n (above en) the value of employment
always goes to −∞. Therefore, there are two possibilities as for the graph of L
illustrated in Figure 3.
2 n
L
n*
A
B
Figure 3. Evolution of average employment
In case A, employment is always an increasing function of the degree of prod-
uct market competition. In case B however, employment is Þrst increasing then
decreasing in product market competition. The critical value n∗ where the mono-
tonicity change occurs can be everywhere for n = n∗ > ne, with ne such that
L (ne) = 0. This case occurs whenever the largest root of a2 · n2 + b2 · n + c2 is
lower than the largest root of g (n) ≡ ∂L
∂n
. An interesting case is clearly one where
n∗ > 2. In that case, an optimal level of competition exists which maximizes
employment
To sum up, the above proposition shows that the eﬀects on employment of
increased competition are basically of two sorts. First, one can recognize a tradi-
tional positive eﬀect that can be associated to reduced market imperfection and
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better employment opportunities: this translates in our model through the posi-
tive eﬀect of increased competition on the hiring rate (which is shifted upward).
However, a second mechanism is present in our model which works through the
wage setting process, particularly the eﬃciency wage formation. Increased com-
petition generates larger separations which in turn lowers employment. One may
express the condition for a negative impact of product market competition on
employment in terms of elasticities. Denoting ηaq the elasticity of a with respect
to q, ηan its elasticity with respect to n and ηqn the elasticity of q to n, one can
show that an increase in n leads to a decrease in total employment if ηan
ηqn
< 2−a
∗
2−q∗ .
Hence, one must conclude that in an eﬃciency wage framework increased com-
petition on product market may indeed have a negative impact on the aggregate
employment performance.
5 Conclusion
According to conventional wisdom, increased competition on product markets
would unambiguously contribute to alleviating the burden of adjustment which
falls on imperfect labor markets when shocks occur. The model presented above
suggests that this assertion needs to be carefully qualiÞed. The adverse eﬀects of
eﬃciency wage rigidities on the labor market are indeed worsened by an increase
in product market competition, when endogenous labor markets ßows are taken
into account. In fact, as in standard imperfect competition models, an increase
in the number of Þrms will have for consequence an increase in price setting real
wages. However, in our model, the subsequent adjustment of the eﬃciency wage
level on the labor market will tend to push the separation and hiring rates up.
As a consequence, the variation of employment levels as a response to any given
shock becomes stronger when competition increases.
This shows that adverse shocks lead to stronger adjustments on the labor
market when product market competition becomes stronger. As a consequence,
stronger competition makes the burden of adjustments that falls on employment
heavier: more competition means more turnover on the labor market. Depend-
ing on the relative elasticities of the separation and hiring rates to an increase
in competition, this may indeed ultimately lead to aggregate employment losses.
One should stress that this result being driven by an eﬃciency wage mechanism,
it does apply even in the absence of any direct regulation on the labor market.
Therefore, even coordinated labor market and product market reforms may in-
deed lead to perverse outcomes if the additional/hidden sources of rigidities are
overlooked.
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